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SHELL v. MISSISSIPPI
111 S. Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990)
United States Supreme Court

FACTS
A trial court convicted Robert Lee Shell of capital murder while
in the act of committing an armed robbery. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-319(2)(e) (Supp. 1989). The jury then sentenced Shell to death.
Relying on the United States Supreme Court decision in Maynardv.
Cartwright,486 U.S. 356,361-64 (1988) (holding"especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance invalid under eighth
and fourteenth amendments because the statutory language did not
direct the jury's discretion in deciding when the death penalty is
appropriate), Shell appealed his sentence on the ground that the court
improperly instructed the jury as to whether the charged murder was
"especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Shell's
sentence because it believed the trial court had "limited the 'especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel' factor in its charge to the jury." Shell v.
State, 554 So.2d. 887, 905-06 (Miss. 1990). The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and for the first time, the Court
unanimously struck down a state's narrowing construction of an
aggravating factor.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that the limiting instruction utilized by
the trial court to define the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel"
aggravating factor was not constitutionally sufficient. In order to be
constitutionally sufficient, a limiting instruction must provide
meaningful guidance to the sentencer. See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S.
Ct. 3047, 3057 (1990). The Court vacated Shell's sentence and
remanded the case to the Mississippi Supreme Court for further
consideration in lightof Clemons v.Mississippi,110S. Ct. 1441 (1990)
(holding that Constitution does not prevent state appellate court from
upholding death sentence that is based in part on an invalid or
improperly applied aggravating circumstance, as long as appellate
court eitherreweighs aggravating and mitigating evidence orconducts
harmless error review). See case summary of Clemons v. Mississippi,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 8 (1990).
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The instruction called into question in this case provided that:
[T]he word heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly
evil; atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and
cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with
indifference to, or even enjoyment of the suffering of others.
Shell, 554 So.2d at 905-06.
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Marshall stated that the
narrowing constructions of "extremely wicked or shockingly evil"
and "outrageously wicked and vile" used by the Mississippi Supreme
Court could be used by a person of 'ordinary sensibility to fairly
characterize almost every murder." Shell, 111 S. Ct. at 314 (emphasis
in original). Even though the narrowed construction of "cruel" might
pass constitutional muster, that would not save Shell's conviction.
Citing the Court's opinion in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 3132 (1969) (holding that when a case is submitted to jury on alternative
theories, the unconstitutionality of any of the theories requires that the
conviction be set aside), Marshall concluded that even if the trial court

correctly defined "cruel," the two unconstitutional alternative bases
of heinous and atrocious which were presented to the jury required a
reversal of Shell's conviction.
The Virginia Supreme Court has said that a trial court's refusal
to give a definitional instruction to the jury and instead instructing
only in the statutory language of aggravating factors, "does not
constitute reversible error." Clark v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 237,
243,257 S.E.2d 784,790 (1979). The court explained its position by
stating that aggravating factors in Virginia's death penalty statute are
"commonly used and each has an accepted meaning." Id. In Virginia,
the jury may impose the death penalty if it finds (1) that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society (future dangerousness); or (2) that
the defendant's conduct in committing the offense was "outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim" (vileness).
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Supp. 1990). Virginia's vileness
factors of "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" are
identical to Georgia's "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman" factors that were found invalid in Godfrey v. Georgia,446
U.S. 420, 433 (1980). The Godfrey decision made it clear that the
statutory language itself provided no sentencing guidance. Id.
Georgia's vileness factors were in turn equated to "heinous, atrocious,
or cruel" in Maynard v. Cartwright,486 U.S. 356 (1988). The U.S.
Supreme Court has not passedjudgment on the application of Virginia's
vileness factors. Thus, application of those factors in Virginia death
penalty cases remains constitutionally suspect.
The Virginia Supreme Court, like Mississippi, purportedly has
applied a narrowing construction to two of the Virginia statutory
vileness factors. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478,248
S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978). In Smith, the court defined "depravity of
mind" as "a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement
surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and
premeditation." Id. "Aggravated battery" means "a battery which,
qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum
necessary to accomplish an act of murder." Id. Virginia has not yet
defined torture. Thus, if the trial court decides to give Virginia's
"narrowing" construction to the jury, especially the construction of
"depravity of mind," Shell indicates that the narrowed construction is
probably not sufficient.
Therefore, in cases where the death penalty is sought or imposed
only on Virginia's vileness factor, defense counsel must file a bill of
particulars which compels the prosecution to identify the aggravating
factors upon which the Commonwealth will rely. This bill of particulars
should inquire into how many and which of the three vileness components the Commonwealth will assert. Additionally, the bill of
particulars should seek disclosure of all "narrowing constructions" on
which the Commonwealth intends to rely. Defense counsel should
also preserve constitutional challenges to the application of Virginia's
vileness factors, whether presented to the jury with or without the
narrowing construction at trial. See Powley, Perfectingthe Record of
a CapitalCase in Virginia, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p.
26 (1990).
In summary, Virginia's vileness factors are equivalenttQ those in
Georgia and Oklahoma found invalid by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Consequently, instructing the jury in nothing more than the statutory
language of the factors is error, and the Virginia Supreme Court's
Clark opinion is no longer good law. Second, the sufficiency of the
narrowing constructions of the factors offered in Smith has not spe-
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cifically been addressed in the federal courts. But, after Shell, those
narrowing constructions may not be sufficient. Finally, the defendant
has a due process right to notice and opportunity to defend against
every aggravating factor and every narrowing construction on which
the Commonwealth intends to offer evidence.
Properly raising and preserving challenges to the application of
the vileness factors is even more critical after Shell. Please contact the

Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for assistance on how to raise
and preserve this claim.
Summary and analysis by:
Ginger M. Jonas

PARKER V. DUGGER
111 S. Ct. 731 (1991)
United States Supreme Court

FACTS
A Florida jury convicted the petitioner Robert Parker of two first
degree drug related murders and recommended a life sentence for both
killings. The trial court judge accepted the jury's life recommendation for one murder but overrode its findings on the second and
sentenced Parker to death. In the latter crime, the judge found six
aggravating factors and no statutory mitigating factors, but did not
discuss non-statutory mitigating evidence. Under Florida law, if a
judge finds clear and convincing evidence that supports the death
sentence, and further determines that no reasonable person could
differ in this assessment, the judge may override the jury's life
recommendation and impose the death sentence. See Tedder v. State,
322 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court found that evidence
of the second murder did not support two of the six aggravating factors
found by the trial court judge. The reviewing court did not vacate the
death sentence because it determined that the trial court found no
mitigating factors to weigh against the four remaining, valid aggravating factors. In the penalty phase, defense counsel offered no mitigating
factors enumerated by the Florida death penalty statute, but did
present evidence that the defendant was under the influence of large
amounts of alcohol and drugs during the murders, that he suffered a
difficult childhood, that none of his accomplices received a death
sentence, and that defendant maintained a positive adult relationship
with his family and neighbors. The Florida Supreme Court did not
consider these non-statutory mitigating factors and affirmed the death
sentence.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the trial court
judge found non-statutory mitigating factors. The Court based its
holding on the fact that the judge overrode the jury's sentencing
recommendation for only one of the two murders. Because the trial
court judge found five aggravating factors in the first killing and
accepted the life recommendation, the Court inferred that the judge
found non-statutory mitigating evidence. Considering that the nonstatutory mitigating evidence applied to both killings the Court further
held that the judge also weighed the non-statutory evidence for the
second killing, but found that evidence supporting the death sentence
was so clear and convincing that no reasonable juror could find
otherwise. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant was
denied meaningful appellate review when the Florida Supreme Court
failed to acknowledge the availability of non-statutory mitigating
evidence. The Court remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court
under the authority of Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990),

which permits either appellate reweighing of aggravating and mitigating factors or harmless error analysis on the correct record.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Florida is a "weighing" state, whose statutory sentencing scheme
differs from that of Virginia. The Florida statute defines certain
aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to the imposition of the
death penalty. See Fla. Stat. §§ 921.141(5) and 921.141(6) (1985 and
Supp. 1990). The death penalty may be imposed only where sufficient
aggravating circumstances exist that outweigh mitigating circumstances. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3) (1985). A jury makes the initial
sentencing recommendation to the judge and the judge imposes the
sentence. Fla. Stat. §§ 921.141(2) and 921.141(3). The jury considers
only those aggravating circumstances enumerated, but may weigh any
mitigating evidence.
The Virginia death penalty scheme requires the jury to consider
only the "vileness" and "future dangerousness" aggravating factors,
and further directs the jury to consider both statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors. However, after reviewing aggravating
and mitigating evidence, the Virginia jury has the option of imposing
a life sentence even if it finds both aggravating factors. Therefore,
there is a strong argument that Virginia is a defacto "weighing" state
and meaningful appellate review must take that into account if one of
the two Virginia aggravating factors is found to be constitutionally
infirm. See case summary of Clemons v. Mississippi,Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 8 (1989).
In any event, the importance of Parker v. Dugger does not depend on whether state review is in a "weighing" state. This case shows
that it is proper for a federal habeas court to monitor whether a state
court truly affords meaningful appellate review of a state sentencing
scheme. This is a different message than that sent by the Courtjust last
term in Lewis v. Jeffers, 111 S. Ct. 111 (1990). See case summary of
Lewis v. Jeffers, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1,p.7 (1990). In
Lewis, the Court assessed the application of an aggravating factor and
held that if any rational fact finder could have found the aggravating
factor, an irrational or inconsistent application by state courts was not
a federal concern. The Parker court went to great lengths to reconstruct the trial record in support of its conclusion that the state court
behaved arbitrarily. In doing so, the Court rejected the dissenters'
position that a state supreme court's findings were "mere errors of
state law."
Summary and analysis by:
Victor A. Lago

